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Abstract 
 
This  article  discusses  the  role  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  in  the  Cyprus 
problem  before  and  after  accession  in  2004.  It  is  argued  that,  before  2004, 
Brussels  provided  limited  incentives  to  the  Greek  Cypriots  to  contribute  to 
resolution but, on the other hand, triggered a pro-solution/ EU trend amongst 
the  Turkish  Cypriots.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  post-accession  era,  the  EU’s 
aptitude  to  contribute  to  a  solution  has  further  decreased:  Greek  Cypriots 
remain with inadequate EU-induced motivation to pursue resolution, while the 
pro-solution/  EU  feelings  of  the  Turkish  Cypriots  have  receded,  also  due  to 
Brussels’  failure  to  fulfill  their  expectations.  While  most  of  the  literature  on 
Cyprus  has  focused  on  the  pre-accession  period,  the  article  offers  a  much 
needed insight into the EU’s role before and after Cyprus’ EU entry. The article 
draws on a variety of data, including a series of elite interviews conducted in 
Belgium and Cyprus. 
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1. Introduction  
  Cyprus acceded to the EU in May 2004. Despite the hopes and efforts of 
the  international  community,  the  EU  accession  process  did  not  manage  to 
provide strong incentives to both communities of the island, the Greek Cypriots 
and  Turkish  Cypriots,  to  reach  an  agreement  in  their  dispute  over  the 
administration of the country and reunify it before the EU entry. In this context, 
Cyprus was welcomed into the EU as a divided island, representing perhaps the 
most complex enlargement case to date. In the post-accession era of Cyprus, the 
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EU’s leverage to contribute to a resolution of the inter-communal dispute is even 
more weakened. Along these lines, this article sheds light on the role of the EU 
in the Cyprus problem, before and after accession in 2004. Although much has 
been written for the pre-2004 period, the role of the EU in the post-accession era 
of the island has not been thoroughly investigated until now. This articles aims at 
addressing this gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
Brussels’ impact on the Cyprus problem before and after EU accession.  
   The first part of the paper discusses the role of the EU in the Cyprus 
problem until EU accession in 2004. Attention is paid to Brussels’ failure to play 
a  decisive  role  in  the  settlement  of  the  Cyprus  problem  and  the  renewed 
momentum for resolution that was provided by the change in Ankara's policy 
towards  Cyprus  in  the late  nineties  and  the  United  Nations  (UN) efforts  for 
resolution, based on the ‘Annan Plan’. The second part of the article assesses the 
post-accession period in the island and the EU’s continuous failure to promote 
the  resolution  of  the  Cyprus  problem.  Here,  the  focus  is  on  how  the  EU 
membership status has affected the Greek Cypriot side and how the relations 
between Turkish Cypriots and the EU have impacted the conflict’s trajectory. 
The paper draws on qualitative analysis of a variety of data, including official 
documents, news reports and a wide range of elite interviews that the author 
conducted in Brussels, Belgium and Nicosia, Cyprus. 
 
2. The pre-accession era: a window of opportunity? 
  The relations of the EU to Cyprus date back in the 1970s, when the Greek 
Cypriot-controlled Republic of Cyprus
1 (RoC) signed a custom union agreement 
between  the  island  and  the  then   European  Economic  Community  (EE C) 
(Tsartsanidis, 1984). However, the importance of the EU for Cyprus increased 
with the application of RoC for EU membership, on 4 July 1990. Initially, the 
application raised the confidence of the international community for a new 
‘window  of  opportunity’  for  the  resolution  of  the  Cyprus  problem.  This 
enthusiasm was based on the assumption that the EU could offer significant 
incentives to both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to pursue meaningful 
reunification  talks  before  EU  accession  (Barkey  and  Gordon,  2001)  and 
guaranteed the political and legal structures for the establishment and efficient 
operation of a new bi-communal Cypriot state (Diez, 2002). However, from the 
                                                 
1 The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
bi-communal  state.  After  inter-communal  dispute  and  the  1974  war,  the  island  was 
administratively and territorially divided into two zones: the Greek-Cypriot-controlled 
Republic of Cyprus in the south and the Turkish Cypriots in the north, self-declared as 
an  independent  state  (Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus-TRNC)  in  1983,  which 
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very beginning, the prospects of EU integration played a counter-productive role 
in inter-communal reconciliation. The Turkish Cypriot side, frustrated with the 
decision  of  the  Greek  Cypriot-controlled  government  of  RoC  to  unilaterally 
apply for EU membership, imputed the application and hardened their position 
on to the inter-communal dispute: ‘the Republic of Cyprus […] was founded on 
the existence of two separate and politically equal communities […] Even if the 
Greek-Cypriot community has […] succeeded in assuming the mantle of "the 
Republic  of  Cyprus",  that  is  not  a  consideration  that  can  now  entitle  it  to 
represent the whole of Cyprus[…] Membership of the European Communities is 
unworkable in a divided island’ (North Cyprus, 2010). 
  Despite that, the opinion of the European Commission (2011) recognised 
the  ‘European-ness’  of  Cyprus  and  its  eligibility  for  membership. Although, 
initially, an important link between a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU 
accession was established, the European Council in Corfu (1994) clarified that 
Cyprus  would  be  included  in  the  next  Enlargement  round,  regardless  of  an 
achievement  of  a  solution.  Practically,  this  meant  that the  Greek  Cypriot-led 
RoC would accede to the EU, while the inclusion of the Turkish Cypriot part 
would  rely  on  the  establishment  of  a  new  bi-communal  state,  which  would 
replace the RoC in the EU integration process. The inclusion of Cyprus in the 
next enlargement round was also a result of a) the diplomatic success of the 
Greek government (Brewin 1999, 151), b) the impressive progress of the RoC in 
meeting  accession  conditionality  (Nugent  1997,  72)
2  and c) the con tinuous 
intransigence of the then Turkish Cypriot leadership with regard to the Cyprus 
problem which could hold the Greek Cypriots hostage in the accession process. 
The Turkish Cypriot side reacted to this change of the EU stance by committing 
to further integration with Turkey (Republic of Turkey, 2008). 
  The deteriorating inter-communal relations were also negatively impacted 
by the relations within the EU -Greece-Turkey
3  triangle and the two Cypriot 
communities. During that period, Greco -Turkish relations  were under one of 
their most turbulent spells
4. Besides, Turkey-Turkish Cypriot integration efforts 
(see above) were countered by an agreement of defence cooperation between 
Greece and the Greek Cypriots (Stivachtis, 2002), while the latter also increased 
their separate military capacity, a move which further strained relations with the 
                                                 
2 For a detailed analysis of the preparations of the RoC for EU membership, see Stefanou 
(2005). 
3 Greece and Turkey have diachronically maintained strong economic, political, social 
and cultural links with the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively and they 
have thus played an important role in the domestic pol itics of the island and the 
evolution of the Cyprus problem.  
4 Incidents that escalated tension between the two sides include: the  Ίμια/ Kardak crisis 
in 1996 (Athanassopoulou 1997); the Abdullah Öcalan affair in 1998 (Onys 2001, 10) 
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Turkish Cypriots (Richmond 2002, 126). Last but not least, the decision of the 
European Court of Justice (Case C-432/92) to impose an embargo on Turkish 
Cypriot  exports
5  to  EU member  states  wounded both the Turkish  Cypriot 
economy (Er￧in interviewed 10 September 2009) and inter-communal relations 
and further increased euro-scepticism in northern Cyprus.  
Thus,  by  late  1990s,  the  situation  in  the  island  looked  distinctively 
gloomy. In this first phase of EU integration, Brussels did not manage to become 
a catalyst for reconciliation. First of all, by lifting resolution as a condition to 
accession, the EU provided no strategic incentives to the Greek Cypriot side to 
pursue reunification. At the same time, the EU did not manage to instigate a pro-
solution attitude in the Turkish Cypriot side either. Along these lines, many have 
argued (e.g. Laraabee, 1998, Christou, 2004, Tank, 2002, Tocci, 2004), that the 
EU overestimated the economic ‘carrots’ provided to the Turkish Cypriots and 
downplayed their security-related concerns related to their position in a potential 
bi-communal state (Ertekun, 1999, 108). Besides, the EU membership of Greece 
and the respective absence of Turkey from the EU increased the Turkish Cypriot 
insecurity  about  their  potential  participation  in the EU  (Christou  2004,  114). 
Lastly, the deteriorating relations between the two 'motherlands' also negatively 
affected inter-communal reconciliation in Cyprus. All these are not to suggest 
that the EU did not play a role in the inter-communal dispute. On the contrary, 
the EU accession process had a counter-productive effect in the Cyprus problem, 
by  triggering  rather  inflexible  attitudes  in  both  communities  (see  above). 
However, the official opening of negotiations for the EU accession of Cyprus in 
1998 and, most importantly, the emergence of a more flexible policy of Turkey 
towards the Cyprus problem gave refreshed momentum to the resolution of the 
inter-communal dispute.  
The Cyprus problem has traditionally held increased importance within 
Turkish foreign policy. For years, Ankara had been rather rigid towards the form 
of solution to the Cyprus problem (Kazan 2002). Nonetheless, the victory of the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi –AKP) of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, in the Parliamentary elections of December 2002, changed the 
attitude  of  the  Turkish  government  towards  Cyprus  and  favoured  a  flexible 
stance to the Cyprus problem (The Independent, 3 January 2003)
6. This change 
of Turkish policy was significant because of the influence that Ankara enjoyed 
                                                 
5  The  decision  justified  the  RoC  claims  that  the  Turkish  Cypriot  products  had  been 
cultivated in lands owned by Greek Cypriot refugees and they, thus, needed the approval 
of the RoC before they were exported in third countries. 
6 Other reasons behind Turkey’s change of policy include: the advantage that Turkey 
will obtain should Turkish Cypriots enter EU as part of a united Cyprus (Suvarierol, 
2003, 66), the extensive Turkish support for EU integration and any policy that would 
contribute to that goal (Celenk, 2007, 350, Heracleides, 2006, 303), the rapprochement 
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over the reconciliation process, both directly as an actor of the dispute and also 
indirectly, through the ample aptitude to affect the Turkish Cypriot stance. This 
new impetus resulted in another initiative on resolving the Cyprus conflict by 
Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the UN. In November 2002, The 
Secretary General presented the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ to the two sides of the 
dispute, in what was widely regarded as the biggest opportunity for resolution 
thus far. The basic provisions called for the creation of a loose confederation, the 
United Cyprus Republic, with two constituent and equal states.  
   The Annan  Plan  was  very  differently  received  in  the  two  sides  of  the 
dispute
7. Despite the initial Turkish Cypriot euro -scepticism, the community 
grew to appreciate the benefits of EU integration and to support the UN -
proposed plan. A series of events displayed a new Turkish Cypriot trend for 
reconciliation, including several rallies that were organised by the local civil 
society (ￇıraklı, interviewed 4 May 2009) and expressed support for the EU and 
solution and opposed the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, who continued to 
be intransigent with regard to reunification efforts (BBC News, 26 December 
2002; Turkish Press Review, 28 November 2002). Besides, this trend was also 
reinforced by the new more flexible policy of the government of Turkey (see 
above).  The  peak  of  this  Turkish  Cypriot  reconciliation  movement  was  the 
elections of December 2003 during which, for the first time in the community’s 
history, the pro-solution parties claimed victory. This elections outcome was a 
clear indication that the Turkish Cypriots were determined to pursue a settlement 
and an EU future (ￇıraklı, interviewed 4 May 2009). Indeed, some months later, 
the Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, the reunification of the island 
and the EU accession of a united Cyprus.  
   On the other hand, the Greek and Greek Cypriot side, initially, welcomed 
the first draft of the plan. Nevertheless, the February 2003 elections in the RoC 
handed the leadership of Greek Cypriots to Tassos Papadopoulos, widely known 
for  his  inflexible  positions  on  the  Cyprus  issue.  The  months  leading  to  the 
referenda  on  the  Annan  Plan,  Papadopoulos,  with  the  help  of  many  Greek 
Cypriot political and social elites created the conditions for a rejection of the UN 
resolution plan (Anastasiou, 2007, 201). A few days before the referenda, in an 
emotional televised message, Papadopoulos directly called Greek Cypriots to 
vote against the proposal: ‘…should our people reject the plan by their vote, [...] 
the Republic of Cyprus will become a full and equal member of the European 
Union  […]  Greek-Cypriot  people,  the  consequences  of  ‘yes’  are  much  more 
severe;  I  call  you  to  reject  the  Annan  Plan’  (Cyprus.net,  2009,  author’s 
translation).  
                                                 
7 For an overview of the positions adopted by the Greek Cypriot (and Turkish Cypriot) 
political elites with regard to the Annan Plan, see Christophorou (2005). 
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   Indeed, some days later, the Greek Cypriots rejected the reunification plan 
with an overwhelming 76% of the vote and Cyprus entered the EU as a divided 
country.  
  As a result, EU accession failed to become a catalyst for the resolution of 
the Cyprus issue. To begin with the Greek Cypriot side, the EU did not succeed 
in instigating a contributing attitude towards resolution, quite the opposite. As 
obvious  from  the  prevailing  elites’  rhetoric  reflected  in  the  message  of 
Papadopoulos, the EU membership was seen as a means to fortify the diplomatic 
position of the Greek Cypriots vis ￠ vis both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, which 
was now a candidate for EU membership. On the other hand, the EU triggered 
some  historical  changes  in  the Turkish  Cypriot  community.  In  spite  of  their 
initial scepticism, Turkish Cypriots soon realised the benefits of reunification 
and consequent EU accession and favoured the Annan Plan and the domestic 
political elites that supported it. However, the rejection of the resolution plan by 
the Greek Cypriots sealed the EU accession of Cyprus as a divided country and 
testified for the overall failure of the EU to contribute to a solution to the long-
standing dispute. 
 
3. The post-accession era: the need for new incentives 
   After accession in 2004, the EU’s relevance to Cyprus has importantly 
changed.  Nevertheless,  Brussels,  although  a  continuous  parameter  of  the 
conflict, remains rather far from a contributing actor to the resolution of the 
Cyprus  problem.  Greek  Cypriots,  guarded  behind  the  newly-acquired  EU 
membership status, remain with limited EU-originated incentives to pursue a 
compromise  in  the  inter-communal  dispute.  What  is  more,  despite  the  EU’s 
increasing significance also to the northern part of the island, the pro-European 
attitudes of the Turkish Cypriots have receded, leaving Brussels with restricted 
aptitude to facilitate a settlement of the Cyprus problem.  
In the Greek Cypriot side, the accession into the EU does not seem to 
have inflicted an important shift in the public stance towards resolution of the 
inter-communal dispute. Although in 2008 the Greek Cypriots elected a more 
moderate  leadership, in  the  face  of  Dimitris  Christofias,  that led to  renewed 
inter-communal negotiations on the future of the island, this does not seem to 
have been an EU-induced change. If anything, the status of EU membership 
appears to have boosted the confidence of the Greek Cypriots as independent 
actors  and  has,  therefore,  reduced  motivation  for  cooperation  towards  the 
achievement  of  a  settlement.  For  example,  the  Greek  Cypriot-controlled 
government of RoC have used their veto power to stop the EU from developing 
trade links with the Turkish Cypriots (see also below) or gain concessions from 
the EU membership candidate Turkey. Indeed, the RoC has played an obviously 
important role in the staggering accession process of Turkey, of which slow pace 
is largely down to Ankara's refusal to implement the 'Additional Protocol' and THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM     93 
 
 
open its ports to the RoC. More recently, the RoC further deployed their leverage 
over Turkish accession to yield Ankara’s flexible stance on the Greek Cypriot 
efforts  for  gas  exploitation  in  the  sea  waters  around  Cyprus  (Reuters,  14 
September 2011). At the same time, the Greek Cypriot-led EU member state 
have  also  used  their  power  in  blocking  Turkey-EU  relations  in  a  variety  of 
contexts, including an effort to veto Turkish participation in EU-Syrian talks 
over the crisis of the middle-east country (Today’s Zaman, 30 November 2011). 
All these developments denote a rather fragile situation between Turkey/ Turkish 
Cypriots  and  Greek  Cypriots,  which  is  actually  reinforced  by  the  EU 
membership status of the latter.  
Once again, changes at the Turkish Cypriot front have been all the more 
interesting. In the aftermath of the EU accession of Cyprus, Brussels declared 
determination  to  help  Turkish  Cypriots  and  address  their  long-standing 
international isolation, as a reward for their positive vote in the Annan plan, 
which indicated the will of people for reunification and an EU future:  
The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a 
future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification 
of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community’ (European Commission 2004). 
In this context, the EU has developed an array of activities in northern 
Cyprus, which, overall, aim at the development of the Turkish Cypriots and their 
preparation for implementation of the EU law (that remains suspended in the 
Turkish Cypriot-controlled territories, according to protocol 10 of the Accession 
Treaty
8). These EU activities have been structured around two Regulations: the 
‘Financial  Aid  Regulation’  (European  Council  2006),  which  aims  at  social, 
economic and political development and preparation for implementation of EU 
law, and the ‘Green Line Regulation’ (European Council 2005), which aims at 
facilitating  trade  between  Turkish  Cypriots  and  Greek  Cypriots,  with  the 
economic development of the former being a primal target. The ‘Direct Trade 
Regulation’ (European Commission 2004b), a European Commission proposal 
for  a  trade  agreement  between Turkish  Cypriots  and  EU  member  states  that 
would have served the EU’s goal of addressing the community’s international 
isolation, is still pending, due to the veto of the RoC. The overarching rationale 
of  those  EU  programmes  has  been  the  contribution  to  the  resolution  of  the 
Cyprus issue, through the integration of the two Cypriot communities and the 
                                                 
8 Although the entire island is thought to have entered the EU, the Turkish Cypriot-
control  territories  are  exempted  from  application  of  the  EU  law,  because  they  are 
considered an area under which the government of the RoC can not exercise effective 
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successful implementation of the EU law throughout the entire island, when a 
solution will bring an end to the suspension of the EU law in northern Cyprus. 
Along  these  lines,  the  EU’s  relevance  to  the  Turkish  Cypriots  has 
considerably increased. The EU constitutes the first major international actor to 
bilaterally engage with the Turkish Cypriot community. In this regard, the EU 
constitutes  a  ‘bridge’  between  the  isolated  community  and  the  international 
world. At the same time, Brussels' financial and technical assistance has helped 
the community and has been the driving force behind essential development and 
domestic changes. The suspension of the EU law in northern Cyprus means that, 
so  far,  efforts  concentrate  on  ‘capacity  building’  and  preparation  of  Turkish 
Cypriots to implement EU acquis. This ‘training’ has been based on the EU 
missions on the ground or Turkish Cypriot visits to EU member states for the 
exchange of best practises (TAIEX 2004, 12; TAIEX 2005, 10) and has resulted 
in the production of a Programme for Future Application of Acquis (PFFA) that 
relates  to thirteen  prioritised  policy  areas.  Until  now,  particular  progress  has 
been recorded in the areas of environment, agriculture, statistics (TAIEX 2007, 
10), financial activities and competition law (TAIEX 2008, 20). This assistance 
has been framed by EU officials as the most important endeavour of the EU in 
the region (EU official a’, interviewed 30 April 2009; EU official b’ interviewed 
15 September 2009).  
Despite  that,  Turkish  Cypriots  still  remain  largely  outside  the  EU 
environment and a series of its benefits and, for that reason, joining the EU (via 
a solution to the Cyprus problem), continues to be a motive for people of the 
community to pursue a compromising solution. First of all, the EU law is not 
applied in northern Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots do not participate in the EU organs 
and  the  proposed  trade  agreement  is  not  yet  implemented.  In  addition,  the 
complex political situation in the island, including the non-recognition of the 
Turkish Cypriot administration by Brussels, has, admittedly (TAIEX 2009, 18) 
posed considerable challenges to the EU's mission on the ground and mediated 
the  ability  of  the  EU  to  assist  the  Turkish  Cypriots  (Erel,  interviewed  9 
September  2009).  In  this  context,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  continuous 
international isolation makes the prospects of EU integration appealing (Akinci 
interviewed  11  September  2009)  and  domestic  political  actors  also  aspire  to 
greater access to EU environment (ￇakıcı interviewed 11 September 2009).  
Nevertheless,  Turkish  Cypriot  pro-European  sentiments,  although  still 
present, are far weaker in comparison to before. Although in 2005, 71% of the 
Turkish  Cypriots  considered  the  EU  membership  a  good  thing  (European 
Commission 2005), in 2011 the percentage of people having a positive image 
about the EU had dramatically dropped to 48% (European Commission 2011). A 
series of interviewed local elites have associated this decrease in EU popularity 
with the inability of Brussels to address the Turkish Cypriot aspirations. Many 
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through, for example, direct trade (Akinci, interviewed 11 September 2009) and 
the  generally  restricted  aid  that  EU  provides  to  the  Turkish  Cypriots  (Er￧in 
interviewed 10 September 2009), especially when this is compared to Turkey’s 
assistance  (Denktaş  interviewed  8  September  2009).Besides,  the  perceived 
complex bureaucracy that the process of claiming EU assistance entails (KTTO 
Representative, interviewed 8 September 2009), the lack of a clear future within 
the EU and Brussels’ reluctance to play a stronger role in the resolution of the 
dispute (ￇakıcı 11 September 2009) further decreased EU’s popularity. This loss 
of interest in the EU has been coupled with a decrease of incentives to contribute 
to the resolution of the Cyprus problem, which could facilitate EU integration. 
Perhaps the most notable manifestation of this declining pro-solution trend is the 
electoral victory (elections 2009, 2010) of the political elites that hold hard-line 
positions with regard to the Cyprus issue.  
As  a  result,  the  post-accession  era  has  seen  even  less  EU-generated 
impetus  for  the  resolution  of  the  Cyprus  issue.  According  to  some  of  its 
objectives, the EU has indeed helped the development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community and the preparations for implementation of the EU law, which will 
be very helpful in the event of a settlement. However, this has not been enough 
to ease the frustration of Turkish Cypriots with the EU, a result of the accession 
of the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC and Brussels' failure to address the Turkish 
Cypriot aspirations for quick benefits and ending of their international isolation. 
On the other hand, Greek Cypriots still remain with no EU-triggered motivation 
to contribute to resolution, especially now that they are ‘armed’ behind the EU 
membership status. Under those conditions, although the EU contributes to a 
more  successful  application  of  a  compromising  agreement  (by  assisting  the 
Turkish  Cypriot  development  and  integration  of  the  two  communities),  it 
remains far from providing the two sides of the ‘Green line’ with incentives to 
pursue a settlement in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the EU does seem to 
play a role in the Cyprus problem but not one that facilitates the achievement of 
a compromising solution: interestingly enough, the EU, due to the variety of 
reasons  mentioned  above,  has  added  to  the  inflexibility  of  both  Cypriot 
communities.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The accession of Cyprus in 2004 signalled the completion of a long EU 
integration  process  and  the  beginning  of  a  new,  European  era  for  the 
Mediterranean island. Despite this increased EU relevance, Brussels have not 
managed  to  contribute  to  the  resolution  of  the  Cyprus  problem,  the  inter-
communal dispute which defines the country and its politics. This, nevertheless, 
it is not to suggest that the EU has not affected the conflict and its parameters 
per  se.  On  the  contrary,  the  potential  for  EU  membership  as  well  as  the 
accession of Cyprus in itself has importantly affected the dispute. For Greek 96   George KYRIS 
 
 
Cypriots, EU integration has been an opportunity to strengthen their negotiating 
position, both before and after accession in 2004. As far as Turkish Cypriots are 
concerned, the years leading up to accession saw an EU-informed pro-solution 
trend, which however, has lost ground, due to an increasing public alienation 
from Brussels. In this context, the EU remains ‘hostage’ of the complex EU 
integration  process  of  Cyprus  and,  although  now  constituting  an  important 
aspect  of  the  Cyprus  problem,  the  impetus  that  has  provided  for  an  actual 
resolution of the dispute remains importantly limited. 
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